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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MARY L. SASSIN 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY AND WALMART STORES 
INC. 
Respondents. 
Case No. 960083-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
ARGUMENT 
I, PETITIONER MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE. 
Respondent's argument Petitioner has failed to marshal the 
evidence is without merit. Petitioner marshaled the following 
facts: 
The employer representative testified that 
Petitioner was fired for having a drink of 
water in the phone area contrary to store 
policy. (Brief of Petitioner at page 6 I 9). 
The employer representative testified that 
Petitioner could get water by walking a 
distance of about 100 feet into a back room. 
(Brief of Petitioner at page 6 fi 10). 
The ALJ stated "the Administrative Law Judge 
finds the employer offered the claimant a 
reasonable alternative by permitting her to 
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keep the beverage relatively close at hand but 
out of the customer sales area." (Brief of 
Petitioner at page 6 J[ 12). 
The employer representative testified that the 
employee manual states that it is unacceptable 
to have food or drink on the floor area. 
(Brief of Petitioner at page 7 j[ 14). 
Based on these facts, the ALJ found that 
Petitioner had the requisite knowledge of the 
drink policy. (Brief of Petitioner at page 7 
5 21). 
In support of its argument, Respondent cites two allegedly 
non-marshaled facts from a 111 page record. Respondent argues 
Petitioner failed to marshal evidence Jim Curtis testified from 
personal knowledge. Respondent argues Petitioner failed to point 
out she had knowledge regarding the company drink policy. 
A. JIM CURTIS NEVER TESTIFIED FROM PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE. 
In support of the argument Jim Curtis presented more than 
hearsay evidence, Respondent states: 
For example "Petitioner's Brief, pages 20-21 
would lead the Court to believe that the 
Administrative Law Judge's findings and 
conclusions that the claimant knew the 
employer's policy, were all based on hearsay. 
This is not correct. at R. 18 the 
Administrative Law Judge asked Mr. Curtis, 
"Did you ever personally talk to her about 
[the policy]?" Mr. Curtis replied, "Yes, I 
did." The Administrative Law Judge then 
asked, "And when was that?" Mr. Curtis 
replied, "It was about a month prior to her 
having it out there, before we terminated 
her." (Brief of Respondent at pages 18-19). 
When taken in context, it is clear Jim Curtis had no personal 
knowledge regarding the relevant evidence. Immediately after 
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stating he had personal knowledge, Mr. Curtis began to testify 
based on hearsay not his alleged personal knowledge. The very next 
statement made by Mr. Curtis is as follows: 
The final incident were associates came to me, 
three different associates, came to me and 
told me that it was still continuing, that she 
wasn't changing, that she had made the 
statement, of course it's hearsay because I 
didn't hear her say it, but what they told me 
she said is that "I don't care what management 
says, I'm going to have it out here." And 
that's when. . . (Emphasis added). (R at 
18). 
B. THE FACT PETITIONER HAD KNOWLEDGE OF THE DRINK POLICY 
IS NOT RELEVANT. 
Respondent further argues Petitioner failed to marshal any 
evidence Petitioner had knowledge of the drink policy. Whether 
Petitioner had knowledge of the drink policy is irrelevant for the 
purposes of this appeal. That is not an issue before this Court. 
In her brief, Petitioner does not contend she lacked knowledge 
of the drink policy. Petitioner contends she appealed the issue to 
the Board of Review, the Board ignored the issue and the failure to 
address the issue was arbitrary and capricious. This is cle4rly 
set forth in Petitioner's brief: 
THE BOARD'S FAILURE TO CONSIDER PETITIONER'S 
ARGUMENT THE EMPLOYER NEVER SHOWED THE ELEMENT 
OF KNOWLEDGE WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. 
(Brief of Petitioner at page ii, Table of 
Contents). 
Was the Board's failure to consider 
Petitioner's contention, that the employer 
never showed the element of knowledge, 
arbitrary or capricious? (Brief of Petitioner 
at page 2, Preservation of the Issue). 
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The failure of the Board to consider the 
issues of knowledge, control, serious effect 
on the employer, or whether the employer met 
its burden at hearing was arbitrary and 
capricious and should be reversed. (Brief of 
Petitioner at page 10, Summary of Argument). 
THE BOARD'S FAILURE TO CONSIDER PETITIONER'S 
ARGUMENT THE EMPLOYER NEVER SHOWED THE ELEMENT 
OF KNOWLEDGE WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. 
(Brief of Petitioner at page 13, Heading). 
In it's decision, the Board never addressed 
the issue of whether the element of knowledge 
was shown by the employer. (Brief of 
Petitioner at page 15). 
Petitioner's "Memorandum in Support of Appeal" 
clearly set forth the relevant facts and 
authority regarding the issue of knowledge. 
(R. 57-59). Since the Board's decision makes 
no reference to this element, its decision 
should be reversed as being arbitrary and 
capricious. (Brief of Petitioner at page 15). 
The Board's failure to address the issues of 
knowledge, control, serious effect on 
employer, and whether the employer met its 
burden at hearing was arbitrary and 
capricious, did not lighten Petitioner's 
burden and should also be reversed. (Brief of 
Petitioner at page 22, Conclusion). 
Since the issue of whether Petitioner had knowledge is not 
before the Court, Petitioner has no burden of marshaling such 
evidence. 
II, IT IS IRRELEVANT WHETHER IT WAS JIM CURTIS OR THE FRICK 
COMPANY THAT FAILED TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE TO MEET THE EMPLOYER'S 
BURDEN SHOWING JUST CAUSE TO DISCHARGE, 
Whether Jim Curtis or the Frick Company is responsible for not 
providing evidence to the court is irrelevant. The Frick Company 
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failed to provide the necessary documentation prior to hearing and 
Jim Curtis failed to provide any credible evidence at hearing. 
Petitioner clearly argued this point in her brief. (Brief of 
Petitioner at pages 18 and 19). Therefore, whether Jim Curtis or 
the Frick Company failed to meet the burden in showing just cause 
for discharge is irrelevant. 
III. RESPONDENT NEVER ADDRESSED THE MAJORITY OF ISSUES RAISED BY 
PETITIONER ON APPEAL. 
In her appeal, Petitioner raised the following issues: 
IT IS NOT A REASONABLE EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE TO 
REQUIRE A SWITCHBOARD OPERATOR TO WALK 100 
FEET TO GET A DRINK OF WATER (Brief of 
Petitioner at page 10). 
THE BOARD'S FAILURE TO CONSIDER PETITIONER'S 
ARGUMENT THE EMPLOYER NEVER SHOWED THE ELEMENT 
OF KNOWLEDGE WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. 
(Brief of Petitioner at page 13). 
THE BOARD'S FAILURE TO CONSIDER PETITIONER'S 
ARGUMENT THE EMPLOYER NEVER SHOWED THE ELEMENT 
OF CONTROL WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. 
(Brief of Petitioner at page 15). 
THE BOARD'S FAILURE TO CONSIDER PETITIONER'S 
ARGUMENT THAT THE EMPLOYER NEVER SHOWED THE 
ACTIONS OF PETITIONER HAD A SERIOUS EFFECT ON 
THE EMPLOYEE'S JOB OR THE EMPLOYER'S INTERESTS 
WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. (Brief of 
Petitioner at page 17). 
THE BOARD'S FAILURE TO CONSIDER PETITIONER'S 
ARGUMENT THAT THE EMPLOYER NEVER MET ITS 
BURDEN TO SUPPORT A SHOWING OF JUST CAUSE FOR 
DISCHARGE WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. Brief 
of Petitioner at page 18). 
Of these five issues, Respondent addressed one. Respondent 
failed to address whether the failure by the Board of Review to 
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deal with the issues of knowledge, control, serious effect on 
employer, and whether the employer met its burden at hearing was 
arbitrary and capricious. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner respectfully requests that the decision of the 
Board of Review be reversed. 
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